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Abstract
Title of Dissertation:

Analysing risks in Naval Operations: the case of
Visit, Board, Search and Seizure operations in Côte
D’Ivoire Navy

Degree:

Master of Science

Navies have growing interests and roles to play in addressing the numerous
contemporary maritime security issues. Visit, board, search and seizure operations
are the privileged modus operandi to deliver law enforcement at sea. However, the
nature of the environment and the threats make these operations expensive and risky.
Côte D’Ivoire Navy, which is one of the main organization dealings with maritime
security matters in this country, faces important challenges during these operations.
The concept of risk analysis represents undoubtedly a useful tool for decision making
under uncertainty. Hence, this dissertation intends to analyse the risks associated
with the dangers in Visit, Board, Search and Seizure operations for the purpose of
developing adequate mitigation measures which will enhance their effectiveness. This
research effort comes to emphasize the need for a more specific and proactive
approach to attenuate risks in these operations. The aim is to stimulate a new
narrative about naval forces and their role to overcome the culture of secrecy for
transparency in security and safety.
First, the realities of Visit, Board, Search and Seizure operations in Côte D’Ivoire were
discussed. Then, the risks were assessed based on the professional judgment and
the personal experience of the naval personnel involved in the course of operations.
Their inputs were introduced in a conceptual framework since no study on the topic
has been formally undergone before. This framework is a combination of previous
methodologies applied on safety and security risk studies. The results were scored,
compared and benchmarked with other navies. Finally, the methods used were
evaluated to appreciate their reliability. At the end, the conclusions demonstrated that
Visit, board, search and seizure operations hold a strategic role in maritime law
enforcement in Côte D’Ivoire. Despite the permanent risk factors, the level of
occurrence of incidents can be considered marginal but with serious consequences.
The results acknowledged that the risk management practices are subjective.
Consequently, risk mitigation measures can have variable performance in bringing
risks as low as reasonably practicable. In this aspect, risk mitigation can be more
effective by implementing a systems approach of physical and administrative barriers
with four pillars: Training, Equipment, Organizational culture and Procedures. Finally,
the observations showed that the methodology used can be suitable to analyse risks
in Visit, Board, Search and Seizure operations since the outputs of different methods
are convergent.

KEYWORDS: Risk analysis, Risk assessment, Risk management, Maritime security,
Maritime interdiction operations, Maritime law enforcement, Visit Board Search and
Seizure operations, Boarding operations, Gulf of Guinea, Côte D’Ivoire Navy
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CHAPTER I
1.

INTRODUCTION

Background of the study
The United Nations Convention of the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) embodies

different provisions related to maritime safety and security. These provisions define
duties and obligations that shall be accomplished by different entities depending on
the countries (UNCLOS, 1982). Cutting a long way short, the enforcement at sea of
the compliance of all treaties and generally accepted international rules can take
multiple forms depending on the maritime zones where it takes place. Nowadays, the
rise of piracy off the horn of Africa, the 9/11 terrorist attacks, the emerging maritime
powers and the inter-states tensions brought up maritime security to the forefront of
international policy agendas (Dalaklis, 2012; Bueger, 2015), making the nature of
maritime security issues even more complex than before (Krause & Bruns, 2016).
Since the early 2000s, the Gulf of Guinea (GoG) has become a zone of concern for
maritime security incidents. In fact, the region which is rich in natural resources
attracts many maritime stakeholders like shipping companies, offshore companies
and fishing vessels. These opportunities coupled with lack of law enforcement
capabilities in some regions led to the surge of illegal activities (Illegal Unreported
Undeclared Fishing, illegal bunkering, illegal trafficking, etc…); more importantly, the
region has become a world hotspot for piracy and armed robbery at sea (Dalaklis,
2012, Okafor-Yarwood et al., 2020). Consequently, in 2013 the governments of the
region came together to address the problem through a memorandum of
understanding between the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS),
the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS) and the Gulf of Guinea
Commission (GGC) and the adoption of a document named Yaoundé Code of
Conduct concerning the repression of piracy, armed robbery against ships, and illicit
maritime activity in West and Central Africa. By signing this agreement, the parties
engaged themselves to cooperate to the fullest possible extent in the repression of
any illegal activities in the region (Judith & Dalaklis, 2017). In order to fulfil their
common goal, the region was divided into maritime zones and an architecture of
Maritime Security Centres has been established. This architecture requires the
development of the intervention capabilities and the Maritime Domain Awareness
(MDA), which is defined as “the understanding of activities carried out in the maritime
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domain, and surrounding environmental circumstances, to support timely decision
making in the fields of maritime security and maritime safety” (Del Pozo et al., 2010,
p. 47). From a military perspective, the objective is also to build an understanding of
any events, activities and circumstances within and related to the maritime
environment which are relevant for the course of operations, namely Maritime
Situational Awareness (MSA) (Dalaklis, 2019). Hence, the countries have devoted a
lot of resources and capacities to the fulfilment of their obligations. Essential parts of
this security system are the Navies and/or Coast Guard of the Coastal states. Indeed,
fighting transnational organized crimes needs to coordinate maritime surveillance and
interception assets at sea (Dalaklis, 2017a). Therefore, the Maritime Security Forces
in the region stepped out to tackle the problems.
With the adoption of its new maritime strategy in 2014, Côte D’Ivoire decided
to address the challenges faced in the maritime domain. Indeed, this strategy, which
is in line with the Yaoundé Code of conduct, provides the framework for an enhanced
cooperation and collaboration between all the state’s maritime stakeholders. This
strategy clearly states, in its strategic orientations, the goal of a safer and more secure
maritime space and a more diverse and dynamic cooperation (RCI, 2014). This
document bestows to the Côte D’Ivoire Navy an essential role in safeguarding the
country’s interests at sea. In order to meet the new requirements, the Navy benefited
from a complete renewal of its assets by modern and more robust vessels between
2014 and 2020 (Groizeau, 2014). Thanks to those capacities, Navy’s assets covered
132 days of operations at sea according to the 2020 Review of operational activities
of Marine Operational Centre (MOC) Abidjan. As part of those demanding operations,
the naval assets conducted multiple Visit, Board, Search and Seizure (VBSS)
operations to fulfil their missions. In general terms, VBSS operations, which is a term
used interchangeably with boarding operations, are seaborne enforcement measures
to intercept the movement of platforms into or out of a state jurisdiction or the high
seas (NATO, 2005). According to Yoe (2019), Risk is everywhere, so uncertainties,
which exist in those operations, make them subject to certain levels of risk either
known or not. Naturally, VBSS operations are hazardous in nature because, first they
require sometimes multiple movements of naval platforms and persons at sea,
sometimes in poor conditions and second the personnel have to deal with a new
environment with uncertainties. Looking at the hazards in the maritime environment
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and the nature of these missions, one can easily deduct that the fulfilment of the
associated tasks implies a level of risk acceptance. For the purpose of this
dissertation, risk is the probability of occurrence of an unwanted event coupled with
the consequence if such event happens. Therefore, an analysis of risks represents a
valuable tool for supporting decision making in those operations in order to strengthen
their efficiency.
2.

Statement of the problem
Any activities carried out at sea come with a level of risk and VBSS operations

are surely not excluded. These operations support the enforcement of national and
international regulations in the waters under the jurisdiction of Côte D’Ivoire. The
country plans to acquire bigger vessels in order to expand its area of competence and
increase the stress on the criminal actors plaguing the seas and subsequently fulfil its
regional obligations of participating in the surveillance of the GoG. Henceforth, navy
personnel will contribute more, leading to a longer exposure to dangers. Since no
records of similar work have been found on the topic in the country, this dissertation
intends to analyse risks in VBSS operations in Côte D’Ivoire Navy to develop objective
measures which could mitigate effectively these risks. The Risk analysis approach
was chosen for this study because of its objectivity and transparency in providing
inputs for decision makers. This research can be of great interest for the country as it
may point out weaknesses and the way of improving one component of its maritime
safety and security system. In addition, this dissertation can complement studies of
Risk analysis in the maritime field.
3.

Aims and Objectives
This dissertation endeavoured to use risk analysis principles to come up with

solutions which could attenuate effectively risks associated with the conduct of VBSS
operations. The completion of the research aimed to achieve the following objectives:
-

To identify dangers associated with VBSS Operations in Côte D’Ivoire and to
estimate risks associated with these dangers

-

To analyse the different factors which influence the development of Risk
Control Measures

-

To develop a list of Risk control options (RCOs) for this type of operations.
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4.

Organization of Research

4.1

Research Questions
The following research questions drove the itinerary process of this

dissertation:

4.2

-

What are the hazards and the threats in VBSS Operations in Côte D’Ivoire?

-

What are the risks acceptance criteria and levels?

-

How does the risk assessment method influence the development of RCOs?

-

How can these risks be managed and communicated effectively?
Research Design
By analysing the nature and the dynamics between the different systems and

the procedures of boarding operations, a list of possible dangers was developed.
Following the identification of dangers, an online survey (administering questionnaire)
was submitted to the maximum number of available stakeholders in order to gather
knowledge based on professional judgement and personal experience in order to
benefit from their inputs as keys actors considering the fact that no casualty reports
were available in the country. The questionnaires online were delivered to allow the
researcher to touch a wide number of respondents and to remove bias in the process.
The risks were assessed using the two different methods, one using the frequency
and the severity and the second using the value of the assets at risk in addition. The
results were prioritized by risk level; subsequently the risk scenarios were developed.
Furthermore, semi-structured interviews of principal actors served to
investigate the risk scenarios in order to identify issues that might have been missed
by the researcher. Indeed, these methods allowed to assess the risk scenarios
through the perception of experts in the field of study, using the critical incident
technique for a qualitative interviewing, which is a technique used to learn from
people’s experience through reflections on a critical incident (Kuada, 2012). Thus, the
list of dangers and the risks scenarios associated was complemented since few
information can be found on the problem and that it is one expert’s judgment was
used to get failures and their causes.
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Then, the analysis of research data evaluated which Risk analysis’s principles
could be applied in VBSS operations and assessed which Risk assessment method
proves more objectivity and transparency for the use in this case. Lastly, a list of
possible RCOs, which describe a set of risk mitigation measures to implement, was
developed based on the outcomes of previous steps. Figure 1 presents an overview
of the itinerary of this dissertation.

Figure 1: Research design (Author)
5.

Structure of the dissertation
This dissertation is structured in six chapters with ten appendices, which

contain the questionnaires and interviews questions and the analytical tools used.
Following this introductory chapter, chapter 2 reviews the relevant works in the
literature addressing risk analysis and VBSS operations. In chapter 3, boarding
operations are briefly presented in the specific context of Côte D’Ivoire. The chapter
4 presents the conceptual framework used for the research. Then, the research
findings are presented and discussed in chapter 5. Finally, chapter 6 gives concluding
remarks and recommendations.
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6.

Ethical considerations
The entire research considered ethical matters thoroughly. Consequently, all

materials and data collected were processed in strict confidentiality with the consent
of participants and the information of participants protected.
7.

Key assumptions and limitations
The Risk assessment was considered from an objectivist approach as it

intends to explain issues which are real and independent of the nature of the systems
involved. In this research, the VBSS operations were approached as operations
involving different systems, with regular and non-regular processes. The boarding
teams fell in the Structural functionalism described by Parson (1951) with four
Characteristics (Adaptation, Goal-attainment, Integration and Latency). The conduct
of the naval operations was also assumed to have unpredictable factors. So whether
consciously or unconsciously, these operations were subjected to an analysis of risks.
In this dissertation, only the risks incurred by the systems directly involved in
VBSS operations were considered, risks related to the political or legal implications
were excluded. Among them, the analysis addressed risks associated with
undesirable or negative consequences for the targeted organization. The research
was limited also by the scarcity of data that might come from the targeted
organizations since all records of operations were not digitalized or disclosed. Finally,
the confidentiality of some government investments did not permit a cost-benefit
analysis of the recommendations.
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CHAPTER II LITERATURE REVIEW
1.

Introduction
This chapter examines previous works conducted in risk analysis and also

focuses on the concept of VBSS operations. It intends to advocate for the possible
productive and necessary links between the two concepts. First, it explores the
diversity of views and opinions about risk analysis. Second, VBSS operations are
revisited to highlight the challenges they pose for decision makers. And finally, the
current trends and perspectives of risk analysis in these operations are analysed. In
summary, this review explores the risk analysis principles and demonstrates their
applicability to boarding operations for the purpose of risk mitigation.
2.
2.1

Risk analysis
General principles
The scientific community has discussed extensively the concept of risk

analysis. Goerlandt and Montewka (2015) classified risk definitions in nine categories
based on the application area, but generally risk is a function of one or more factors
among probability, event, consequence of event and uncertainty. The Society for risk
analysis (SRA) described risk as the potential for realization of unwanted, adverse
consequences to human life, health, property, or the environment (as cited by Ozbas,
2013). While some scholars preferred to define risk quantitatively (Kaplan & Garrick,
1981; Kaplan, 1997). Here again, researchers’ views differ, yet Aven (2012)
concluded that “Risk = C & U” is the most appropriate type of risk definition, where C
represents the consequences and U the uncertainty. However, for a large body of
literature, the aim of risk analysis is to inform a decision in order to mitigate risks by
balancing costs and benefits (Aven & Zio, 2014; Cox, 2009; Goerlandt & Montewka,
2015; Ozbas, 2013, Yoe, 2019)
Evaluating alternatives before decision making has been a long lasting
method for humans. Covello and Mumpower (1985) described the evolution of the
risk analysis from the simple practices of interpreting the signs of gods to the modern
probability theory introduced by Pascal in the late 17th century. Following the work of
Pascal, many scholars used mathematical theories of probability to solve societal
problems. Besides, they added that the qualitative aspect of modern risk analysis

-7-

stemmed from the scientific method for identifying the causal links between adverse
consequences and hazardous activities, primarily for health issues.
The literature proved that multiple methods and techniques can be used to
conduct a Risk analysis. The suitable method to use depends on different factors or
circumstances (Ozbas, 2013). Yoe (2019) made a clear description of Risk analysis.
He considered risk analysis like a science and a paradigm which intends to improve
science-based decisions making under uncertainties for a given problem.
Furthermore, the author divided the process of Risk analysis into three tasks namely
Risk assessment referring to the science aspect, Risk management in relation to the
social values in it and Risk communication for the interactive exchange of information.
Aven (2012) advocated also a separation between risk per se and risk management
and risk perception. Whereas Beck et al. (1992) argued they coincide. Hence, some
fundamental issues should be tackled to reach a better conceptual understanding of
risk among the scientific community (Aven & Zio, 2014). Furthermore, Yoe (2019)
estimated that a difference should be made between Risk assessment and Safety
analysis, where the former one considers risk broadly and focus on the risks of
interest. Reason why any method used for analysing risks starts by the dangers’
identification.
2.2

Identification of dangers
Yoe (2019) assimilated a hazard as any potential source of harm to a valued

asset. Bennett (2018) in his book defined it as “an act or condition posing a source of
potential danger or adverse condition” (p.215). So, these two definitions describe
hazard like anything with potential harmful consequences. In general, risk is described
as a safety or security issue. At the International Maritime Organization (IMO), the
introduction of chapter XI-2, addressing maritime security, in the SOLAS convention,
acknowledged the imbrication between safety and security matters (Dalaklis, 2017b;
Joseph & Dalaklis, 2021). Based on the definition of maritime safety and maritime
security given by Del Pozo et al. (2010) and Klein (2011), Safety primarily refers to
those dangers emanating from an unwanted event like an accident, a natural disaster;
in contrast Security deals rather with the threats derived from a clear human
motivation to do harm. Whether it is from a security or a safety perspective, the first
step in the risk analysis process is to identify those dangers.
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The literature provided many different methods for the dangers’ identification.
It can be done using a Fault Tree Analysis, an Event Tree Analysis, a Failure Mode
and Effect Analysis (FMEA), a Hazard and Operability Study (HAZOP), a Human
Reliability Analysis (HRA), a What If Analysis Technique, a Risk Contribution Tree or
Influence Diagrams (IMO, 2002). All these methods could require the participation of
experts or knowledgeable persons and/or the use of statistical data if available
(Ozbas, 2013). The literature showed that the prioritization of the hazards could be
achieved by using a generic risk matrix combining the Frequency and the Severity or
Consequence. In his thesis, Kontovas (2005) showed that several organizations
developed different Risk Matrices to meet their needs. In this regard, he mentioned
also that risk matrices may be problematic because they underestimate risk
accumulation or bring discrimination between scenarios. Cox (2008b) supported also
this view by arguing that little research validated the performance of risk matrices so
that they should be used carefully with clear explanations of embedded judgments. In
their critical review, Kontovas and Psaraftis (2009) also estimated that Frequency of
an accident does not necessarily depict reality. They recommended the use of a
Bayesian approach and the terminology “probability” not only in the semantic but also
substantively. Such findings put forward the fact that Risk analysis needs to be
reviewed in some aspects in order to enhance its effectiveness.
2.3

Risk assessment
The body of literature also acknowledged the fact that Risk assessment can

be either quantitative, qualitative or mixed methods. The purpose of this process is to
investigate the causes and consequences of the likelihood of scenarios resulting from
the identification of hazards (IMO, 2002). Even if, the techniques promoted by the
IMO rely mostly on quantitative data, several scholars thought that the definition of a
qualitative risk assessment scheme should be more appropriate and reliable
(Hermanski & Daley, 2010; Kontovas & Psaraftis, 2009; Rosqvist & Tuominen, 2004;
Wang, 2001). Cox et al. (2005) suggested that qualitative risk rating can perform
among risks separated in clusters but it is not always the case, so a practical
quantitative risk assessment methods should be developed for broad classes of
situations in which qualitative are not necessarily reliable. Consequently, in the
maritime sector, data of accidents, like number fatalities, frequency of accidents or
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the severity of their consequences, represent the basis for analysis. And three levels
of risk usually express risk acceptance criteria: negligible, tolerable, and intolerable.
The risks classified tolerable are meant to be As Low As Reasonably Practicable
(ALARP) (Joseph & Dalaklis, 2021; Wang, 2001). Soares and Teixeira (2001) stated
that individual risk criteria, including occupational risk, are measured in fatal accident
rate and societal risk criteria are represented using F-N curves that link the frequency
(F) and the number of fatalities in accidents (N). They also added that a criterion for
environmental protection needed to be developed. In addition, many scholars
advocated that the use of expert judgement can be valuable (Apostolakis, 1990;
Merrick & Van Dorp, 2001; Ulusçu et al., 2009). Nevertheless, Goerlandt (2015)
estimated that the Risk analysis in the maritime transport sector is centred around the
Formal Safety Assessment (FSA) approach and that research should consider the
development of additional frameworks and risk indicators.
2.4

Risk management
Informing a decision is a widely accepted purpose of risk analysis, but

controversial views about how to do it exist. Several researchers considered the
opposing views concerning the foundations of risk analysis as a scientific activity and
the nature of the concept as the root causes of the divergence (Goerlandt &
Montewka, 2015). Risk assessment leads to the creation of a list of high risk profile
scenarios that need to be addressed in order to develop Risk control measures
(RCMs). A RCM represents a measure which provides necessary barriers either to
minimize the consequence of a hazard or to reduce the likelihood of its occurrence.
Then, RCMs can be grouped in RCOs in order to address risks and their underlying
causes (IMO, 2002). Yoe (2019) referred to them as Risk management options
(RMOs) which should reduce the risk to an acceptable or tolerable level. Even if those
options must be comprehensive to cover a wide spectrum of type of risk (existing,
future, historical, residual, transferred, transformed…), risk assessments may not
depict the reality, they provide only information to decision makers (Yoe, 2019). In this
respect, Cox (2009) claimed that risk-mitigating measures based on risk scoring
systems do not consider the correlation between risks and called for the use of
optimization models which consider those dependencies.
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3.

The concept of Visit, Board, Search and Seizure Operations
VBSS operations represent the heart of the broad concept of Maritime

Interdiction Operations (MIOs). According to NATO (2005), a MIO comprises
enforcement measures at sea which seeks to intercept the movement of certain types
of items into or out of a nation or specific area. VBSS operations are commonly the
responsibilities of Navies. However, a boarding is not the solely privilege of navies.
Indeed, law enforcement authorities of a country, like Coast guard, Police or maritime
inspectors, may board a ship flying its flag. As the concept of maritime security
evolves coast guard and naval activities overlap and the main difference is the legal
implications depending on the maritime zones in which a boarding take place
(Guilfoyle, 2017).
3.1

Legal framework
In the literature, the right of visit is thought to emanate from the historical

controversy around the legal principles of Mare Clausum, which claims sovereignty
and jurisdiction over the seas, versus Mare Liberum, namely the principle of freedoms
of the seas. Mare Clausum is thought to be the rationale behind this interference on
the high seas (Papastravridis, 2011). Papastravridis (2011) demonstrated, however,
that the two principles are complementary in reality and proposed three positive
perspectives through which the legal order of the oceans matches with this exception
of the freedoms of the seas.
The legal framework supporting VBSS operations is often qualified as the law
of maritime interdiction. This legal framework stemmed from what Gavouneli (2007)
qualified as the functional jurisdiction on the high seas (as cited by Papastavridis,
2011). This framework has become, over time, a combination of international law and
national law of the parties involved in the course of the boarding operations. Even if,
the scope extends beyond them, the most noticeable provisions for VBSS operations
are found in the realm of international maritime conventions.
3.1.1

United Nations Conventions and resolutions
The UNCLOS, also widely known as the “constitution of the sea”, was the first

international maritime convention to enshrine the last lasting maritime principle of the
right of visit. The conduct of VBSS operations represents a direct correlative of this
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right. Article 110 of UNCLOS justifies a boarding in the high seas if there is reasonable
ground that the suspected ship:
-

Is engaged in piracy

-

Is engaged in the slave trade

-

Is engaged in unauthorized broadcasting and the flag State of the warship has
jurisdiction

-

Is without nationality

-

Though flying a foreign flag or refusing to show its flag, the ship is, in reality,
of the same nationality as the warship.

This right, which is a reflection of customary international law, stands as an exception
of the exclusive jurisdiction of the flag State over ships flying its flag defined in article
92 of UNCLOS which is concomitant with the principle of the freedom of the high seas
in article 87. However, the principle of “further examination” in Article 110(2), if the
suspicion remains after examining the ship’s papers, has different interpretation in the
literature. Some argued that it should not be used for purposes other than those
warranted stopping the vessel (Norquist et al. 1985). Guilfoyle (2017) estimated that
this right is a general one and nothing should prevent a conduct of a search with
ulterior motive if it can feed back to the flag state information concerning illegal
activities.
Exceptionally, the UN Security Council resolutions (UNSCR) may authorize
warships to board and visit foreign-flagged vessel under particular circumstances
(Guilfoyle, 2015). States may also conclude bilateral or multilateral arrangements or
treaty law for consensual boarding in accordance with international law to suppress
illegal activities or to protect the marine environment (Klein, 2011). Furthermore,
under the article 17 of the Vienna convention against illicit traffic in narcotic drugs and
psychotropic substances, the interdiction of a suspected vessel in the high seas
requires necessarily the flag state consent (Vienna convention, 1988). More
collaborative efforts exist to board and inspect ships under the UN fish stocks
agreement. Under the relevant regional fisheries management organization (RFMO),
State parties can conduct boarding on other flag states’ vessels whether or not they
are parties but they still need to report to the flag state, whose inaction within three
days, can allow further enforcement measures to take place. (UN fish stocks
agreement, art. 21; Warner, 2016). Likewise, Article 8 of the migrant smuggling
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protocol provides for a party to give permission to take actions including boarding to
another party in case where a vessel flying its flag is reasonably suspected of
smuggling migrants, but the protocol reserves to the flag state the right for
prosecution. Also, the inherent right of self-defence during a conflict under article 51
of the UN charter authorizes a warship to stop and to board a foreign-flagged ship
when she is reasonably suspected of supplying weapons to a third party in on ongoing
armed conflict. This is what is referred as the principle of belligerent right of visit and
search. Nonetheless, the above-mentioned provisions apply to the high seas.
Whereas in waters under the jurisdiction of a state, UN instruments defined
limitations to VBSS operations. In fact, the right of visit is in most case related to
criminal jurisdiction in waters of a coastal state. The UNCLOS and the Geneva
convention on the territorial sea exclude the exercise of criminal jurisdiction over a
foreign ship unless the conditions of innocent passage are not met. Guidfoyle (2017)
stated that, although, the right of innocent passage in the territorial seas, can be
considered as an immunity from VBSS operations, in reality the only exceptions to
conduct law enforcement activities are for sovereign immune ships and crimes
committed before the vessel entered the territorial sea and is simply transiting without
entering internal waters (UNCLOS Article 21 and Article 27(5)). Concerning the
contiguous zone, Article 33(1) of UNCLOS, may provide grounds for boarding in case
of infringements of customs, fiscal, sanitary and immigration laws within a coastal
state’s territory or territorial sea. But Shearer (1986) argued that the powers of the
coastal state are limited to inspections and warnings rather than arresting vessels.
Furthermore, under article 73 of UNCLOS, a coastal state can conduct a boarding to
enforce its privileges, pertaining to the natural resources in the Exclusive Economic
Zone (EEZ), in accordance with article 56 of the same convention. Additionally,
Articles 211(5), 220(5) and 220(6) contain provisions which may grant a coastal state
to conduct control in its EEZ in case where activities which jeopardize the marine and
coastal environment are clearly identified. Regarding the master’s authority over its
vessel, recognized also in customary law, UNCLOS article 27(3) defined specific
conditions where a master’s consent might authorize a boarding in waters under
jurisdiction of a coastal state for criminal jurisdiction. Because the aforementioned
provisions are less subject to interpretation, VBSS operations are primarily backed up
by the framework of the UN, particularly for a foreign-flagged vessel in the high seas.
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3.1.2

IMO Conventions

The IMO is a specialized agency of the UN, ensuring through its regulations, a
safe, secure, efficient and sustainable maritime transportation (IMO, 2019). Emerging
issues, like piracy and terrorism, pushed the organization to orient its work towards
security matters (Bueger, 2015). The organization, which is a technical body, only
provides provisions to support boarding operations. Indeed, regulation XI-2/8 and
regulation V/34-1 of the SOLAS 1974 Convention recognize the master’s discretion
in matters of safety and security. Under this principle, the master has the authority to
deny access or to give permission to search the vessel in port. The ISM Code made
a similar reference by defining the master’s overriding authority for decisions affecting
the safety of its vessel (Dalaklis, 2017b). Whereby, the 2005 SUA protocol authorizes
boarding by a state party only with the consent of the flag state. However, a party to
this convention can opt in to a clause, in article 8bis, that give presumption of
authorization to another state party to visit and search ships flying its flag if the request
exceeds a defined period of time, four hours usually. While, the master’s authority is
limited to the turnover of individual who is reasonably believed to have violated the
regulations. Despite those provisions, it is understood that the IMO instruments did
not formally define an exception of the exclusive flag state jurisdiction to allow a
boarding.
3.2

Principles and dynamics
Generally, commercial vessels are boarded to ensure compliance with

international law or to conform UN resolutions, but in some extent to gather
intelligence for the purpose of operations (Guilfoyle, 2017). The different types of
MIOs are embargo operations, drug interdiction, location of suspected vessel,
environmental patrol, fishery patrol and refugee recovery. These operations are
carried out by warships with small crafts and/or helicopters to transfer the personnel
on the visited ship. They are usually limited to control the documents and cargoes in
support of international law or in certain cases for maritime law enforcement. The
composition of the command structure varies depending on factors like area of
operations, goals or command intents. An indicative basic Command and Control
structure, according to the doctrine followed by NATO in relation to these operations,
is illustrated in figure 2.
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Figure 2: MIO Command and Control structure (NATO, 2005)

The On-scene commander (OSC) is the commanding officer (CO) of the
boarding ship, the ship which provides the boarding party or boarding team. The
boarding party is under the control of the Boarding Officer (BO) who has the
responsibility to visit and to search the suspected vessel. But the overall control of the
operations remains with the OSC. The composition of boarding party varies
depending on the prevailing situation but figure 3 shows its typical command and
control. The personnel involved are expected to carry weapons and equipment for
their own protection. The course of MIOs can be divided in four main phases: the
detection and surveillance phase, the interrogation, approach and stopping phase,
the boarding and searching phase and the diversion phase.
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Figure 3: Boarding party command and control (NATO, 2005)
3.3

Challenges
As defined before, VBSS operations are integrated parts of MIOs. Many

scholars tried to address the challenges faced in the conduct of these operations. The
first challenge is the comprehension and the interpretation of the law of maritime
interdiction. In fact, for a boarding to take place the prevailing circumstances have to
be legally justified. MIOs revealed the long lasting paradigm of the balance between
protection of security interests and the legal principles governing the use of the sea
(Fink, 2010). If the right of visit under UNCLOS article 110 poses less issue of
interpretation, the master’s authority or consent for a boarding, implied in several legal
instruments, remains subject to different points of view. Indeed, the master’s authority
in UNCLOS article 27 doesn’t remove the flag state’s consent to authorize the search
of the ship. The IMO regulations also entrust masters in decisions concerning the
safety and security of their ships but define the extent of this authority (Dalaklis,
2017b). Concerning a search for fighting terrorism, nothing dismisses the flag state’s
consent unless the person poses a direct threat to the safety and security of the ship
(Hodgkinson et al., 2007). When the flag state consent is also required, the national
authority for confirming registration or for giving permission may not be clearly
identified, if not different (Guilfoyle, 2016). Moreover, the current MIOs are very similar
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to law enforcement operations, thus the law of maritime interdiction should also
include legal considerations as human rights and criminal law because the completion
of the entire process requires interagency approach and all threats find their root
causes on land (Fink, 2010). For instance, Moore (2016) advocated a more similar
approach of the meaning of the use of force by boarding officers, whose principles
derive from the Saiga case in international human rights law. Guilfoyle (2016) added
that the consent for visit and search does not generally mean consent for arrest and
prosecution in some legal instruments. Fink (2010) estimated also that the new
political settings and the changing nature of maritime threats, the scope of the right of
visit has been broadened. As a consequence, UNSCRs may not be relevant to justify
in every boarding under a specific mandate and the inherent right of self-defence in
article 51 of the UN charter may become subject to many interpretations (Hodgkinson
et al., 2007). Therefore, from a legal perspective, all aspects of international and
domestic law should be specifically reinforced in MIOs to make them effective.
The second challenge of boarding operations lies in their inherent risky nature.
These operations are subject to the presence of security threats and safety hazards
at the same time. Indeed, during VBSS operations the situation can go from simple
to very complex in a very short period of time either because of new orders or
unpredictable events. NATO (2005) classified the types of boarding according to the
level of threat and the available information about the visited vessel. However, the
literature discussed the dangers all together without one taking precedence. For
instance, in the boarding and search phase, which is considered the most hazardous,
ships have to conduct close manoeuvers from each other, making navigational risks
higher. In addition, getting the boarding party on and off the suspected vessel with a
small craft or a helicopter requires a pilot’s ladder operation, which is risky even in the
best conditions, or a fast rope-dropping operation respectively. Later, the boarding
party could be dealing with non-cooperative people on board the suspected vessel
especially during illegal trafficking interdiction or counter-piracy operations. Even if, it
is recognized that in most cases the crew or passengers do not pose a serious threat,
hostile acts can be expected from them (NATO, 2005). They are also exposed to
hazards either occupational or operational characterizing the maritime industry. For
example, when dealing with cargo holds or tanks, poor or inexistent lighting, structural
damage of ladders, oil on the deck, noxious or hazardous vapours, deficiency of air,
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bad stowage of cargo, presence of explosives or domestic animals, are all possible
hazards which the boarding party may be exposed (NATO, 2005). Hence, it appears
that each boarding need a level of risk taking. According to NATO (2005), safety is
paramount and must not be sacrificed for any reason. This is why Guilfoyle (2016)
concluded that “apart from the legal restrictions, the hazard and expense of maritime
interdiction operations tends to ensure that they are an exceptional measure” (p. 265).
4.

Visit, board, search and seizure operations and Risk analysis
Various documents have acknowledged the existence of risks in boarding

operations. NATO (2005) recommended a threat assessment before undertaking a
boarding and preconized a wide list of guidance and equipment to ensure the safe
conduct of the operation. Even though, dangers are mentioned, the document does
not provide an objective method to assess them nor to prioritize them. It advises
mostly to rely on intelligence to evaluate and to address the risks based on the
experience of persons. The multinational character of the organization, which has
different countries with different capabilities and regulations, may probably be the
reason for this flexibility. As Feldt (2016) stated “members of NATO…retain their right
to make national decisions” (p. 22). In addition, the risk management approach is very
broad and did not target any dangers specifically. The risk management method
developed by the United States Coast Guard (USCG), named the General
Assessment of Risk (GAR) tool, described a similar approach to reduce risk.
However, this tool applies not only to boarding operations but also to any other
operation at sea. This broad and subjective risk management approach can be
explained by the acceptance of some level risk which characterizes military
organizations, which means that risks could exist but the overall appreciation of the
situation should prevail. The USCG viewed the process as one to increase
performance by lowering risk exposure because calculated risks is often the norm in
operations at sea (USCG, 2018). Nonetheless, the GAR model is an analytical tool
which help converting the judgement of persons in numerical score and assessing
risks with a simple risk acceptance scale.
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5.

Summary of chapter II
The literature has widely discussed risk and the methods to address risks are

as different as the nature of the subject studied differs. Yet, it is a common accepted
statement that risk analysis is a useful tool serving decision making. The literature
surrounding MIOs, and VBSS operations in particular, focused on the legal challenges
posed by these enforcement measures. Even if the legal framework supporting
boarding operations is different between international law and national law
enforcement, the conduct of these operations is almost similar in the processes and
the risks associated may converge. Even tough, “at-sea interdictions are logistically
complex, potentially dangerous and often very expensive” (Guilfoyle, 2009, p. 95), the
literature provides few insights for risk analysis in VBSS operations. Although they
mentioned the hazardous nature of these operations, the measures to mitigate the
dangers are general and not specific. So, the question of their real effectiveness is
yet to be discussed. This research effort came to emphasize the need for a more
specific and proactive approach to attenuate risks in these operations. The aim is to
stimulate a new narrative about naval forces and their role to overcome the culture of
secrecy for transparency in security and safety. Achieving this objective necessitated
to seek reactions in response to analysis and assessment before a serious
unfortunate event occurs.
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CHAPTER III VISIT, BOARD, SEARCH AND SEIZURE OPERATIONS IN CÔTE
D’IVOIRE
1.

Introduction
The Republic of Côte D’Ivoire is one of the states bordering the GoG. It is

located in West Africa, more precisely between Ghana and Liberia and South of Mali
and Burkina Faso. Its EEZ extends up 200 NM from its coast line of 550 km (see
figure 4). Its coastal area has also a vast network of lagoons covering 1200 km2 and
extending over 300 km (Sankaré et al., 1999). The seaborne trade uses the two ports
in Abidjan and San Pedro. In 2020, these ports registered more than 2700 ship calls
of all types (PAA, n.d.; PASP, 2021). In order to secure this maritime trade, Côte
D’Ivoire relies primarily on its navy.

Figure 4 : EEZ limits of Côte D’Ivoire (Sylla & Kouakou, 2016)

2.

National legislation
The national legislation for VBSS operations originated essentially from the

National Strategy for the State’s Action at sea (SNAEM), and is centred around
maritime law enforcement. This latter document describes the Côte D’Ivoire Navy as
the centre piece of the Coast guard function, in other words the surveillance and the
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control of activities in waters under the country’s jurisdiction. This strategy devotes to
the navy the missions of sovereignty and protection of national interests (RCI, 2014).
In addition, the law organizing the defence and the armed forces, in its article 14,
stipulates that the Navy participates to actions for peace and international law. Its
article 26 acknowledges the duties described in the SNAEM and adds the defence of
maritime zones (RCI, 2016a). Although, these two documents do not embody any
explicit mention of VBSS operations, they imply that the navy has the right and the
duty to execute them in accordance with international conventions which Côte D’Ivoire
is party to.
The regulations of fisheries are more precise concerning the authorization for
boarding operations. First, in articles 983 and 985 of the maritime code, any fishing
vessel in Ivorian waters is subject to controls and officers in command of Navy ship
have the right for the search and the ascertainment of infractions (RCI, 2017).
Second, the fishing and aquaculture law authorizes the conduct of visit and search
without special mandate in its article 70. Finally, this law, in its article 80, bestows to
the Navy the operational coordination of monitoring, control and surveillance activities
of foreign-flagged vessels, which requires joint teams of Maritime administration
(MARAD), Navy, Fisheries and/or Customs personnel (RCI, 2016b). In this respect,
the country concluded an agreement with the European Union (EU) for the control of
its vessels operating in Côte D’Ivoire waters (EU, 2018). Thus, boarding operations
for fisheries control relies on clear national provisions.
3.

The Côte D’Ivoire Navy
The Côte D’Ivoire Navy is one of the three main branches of the armed forces.

its role is to safeguard the maritime interests of the country and to ensure the defence
of the territory in collaboration with the other forces. Indeed, various legal and policy
documents assign maritime law enforcement duties to the Navy. So, fisheries control,
illegal trafficking interdiction, piracy and armed robbery, safety of navigation, marine
pollution and SAR response are all activities under its responsibility. Despite its
relative small size, all these functions are more or less accomplished.
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3.1

Structure of Command
The naval units and personnel are housed by the infrastructure in the three

bases of the country in the towns of Abidjan, San Pedro and Adiaké. The Navy staff
is chaired by a Chief of Navy Staff (CNS) who has under his command different units.
Figure 5 describes the organizational chart of this military organization. The chief of
operations and his bureau plan and order missions at sea. Then, activities are placed
under the supervision of two MOCs in Abidjan and San Pedro, which are information
and command centres. On-scene, the command remains with the CO of the ship
deployed at sea. In the case, there are several units involved, the OSC will be the
most experienced CO or the designated officer. Also, different offices and units
support the deployment of assets at sea in providing logistics, medical care and
personnel.
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Figure 5: Organizational structure of Côte D’Ivoire Navy (Author)
3.2

Naval assets
As mentioned earlier, Côte D’Ivoire has undergone a deep restructuration and

renewal of its naval force. The naval assets are mainly the fleet of patrol vessels, the
lagoon squadron of small crafts and special boats and the standing group of marine
commandos. Figure 6 and figure 7 represent the main naval platforms used for
boarding operations.
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Figure 6 : Fast patrol vessel (Plisson, n.d.)

Figure 7: Special boat (UFAST, n.d.)
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4.
4.1

Context of VBSS operations
Importance
Due to its capabilities, Côte D’Ivoire Navy conducts patrols, to ensure the

safety of navigation and to secure the marine resources in the EEZ of the country,
relatively close to the coast. Oil and Fish are the main concern among those
resources. Indeed, they are threatened by illegal activities principally IUU fishing and
piracy and armed robbery at sea. The country also faces a number of illegal trafficking
activities especially using small craft (Mieu, 2020). This situation could have been
exacerbated by the “grey” zone which prevailed during the settlement of the maritime
borders dispute between the country and Ghana since the jurisdiction over the
disputed area could not be defined (Ioannides, 2017). The recent discoveries of
offshore oil reservoirs could also awake intentions of criminals in the country (Eni,
2021, September 01; Total energies, 2014, April 17; Tullow Oil, 2012, June 7).
Furthermore, as Côte D’Ivoire expects to fulfil its regional and international
commitments for the security in the GoG, VBSS operations will be more and more
required. Consequently, the strategic importance of these operations for the stability
of the country requires them to be effective.
4.2

Boarding party
In Côte D’Ivoire, VBSS operations are carried out by naval personnel using

the vessels and small crafts described in section 2.2. The command and control is
adapted from the one presented by figure 3 and varies because of the difference of
size and equipment with NATO countries. The patrol vessels (see figure 6) are the
main platforms used for VBSS operations. They house a rigid hull inflatable boat at
the stern for the transfer of the boarding party on the visited vessel. One particularity
is that the boarding party are teams, specially trained for the purpose, originated from
the standing group of marine commandos. While the small craft crew members are
part of the “visiting” Navy vessel’s crew. However, inspectors from the fisheries
department, the MARAD or the customs could be integrated to the boarding party in
specific missions in order to benefit from their expertise, in accordance with the
pooling of resources strategy in the SNAEM (RCI, 2014). In few occasions, the
boarding can take place inside or in the vicinity of the ports using small crafts or
special boats only (see figure 7).
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5.

Summary of chapter III
Boarding operations are essential for Côte D’Ivoire in delivering law

enforcement at sea in an area where maritime “insecurity” can threaten its interests.
To do so, its Navy plays has a prime role and intends to achieve this duty using the
assets at its disposal. When it comes to the strategy to make these operations safer,
very few literature addresses risks in VBSS operations in Côte D’Ivoire. Some reports
highlighted the necessity for capacity building to improve the level of performance of
the enforcement agencies despite the multiple actions undertaken (Okafor-Yarwood
et al., 2020). Therefore, insights from this dissertation can contribute valuably to the
improvement of their efficiency. The absence of previous similar research led this
study to adopt a conceptual framework combining different risk analysis frameworks.
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CHAPTER IV RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
1.

Introduction
This dissertation intends to analyse the risks associated with dangers in VBSS

operations for the purpose of developing adequate mitigation measures. The
objective is to produce relevant outputs to inform decision makers. The novelty of the
topic drove the work towards the utilization of different methods of risk assessment in
order to collect sufficient data to conduct a fair analysis. For the purpose of clarity in
this dissertation, “hazards” designate dangers related to safety and “threats” dangers
related to security.
2.

Operationalization of the research process
The methodology of the research was framed by separating the risk analysis

process into risk assessment, risk management and risk communication, as
described in the literature review by Yoe (2019). This three-step process allowed the
research to explore boarding operations through the lens of each principle and to
understand their relationship in order to enhance the adequacy of the RCOs. For this
reason, the research involved all the actors in the chain of command of VBSS
operations either at sea or on land, as indicated in figure 1 and 2 in section 3.2 of the
literature review. The risk assessment process consisted of three main parts, namely
risk profile, identification of hazards and threats, and risk estimation. The risk
management and the risk communication were achieved through the development of
RCOs (outputs) based on the results of the risk assessment (inputs). Regarding the
dynamic and data-scarce nature of these operations, this dissertation adapted a
combination of risk analysis frameworks (Merrick & Van Dorp, 2006). Figure 8 shows
the structure of the methodology framework.
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Figure 8: Research conceptual framework (Author)
3.

Origin of data
Data used in this dissertation were originated from two survey questionnaires

and semi-structured interviews with boarding operations stakeholders from the Côte
D’Ivoire Navy and the PAA but also the Senegal Navy and the Nigeria Navy for
benchmarking. In fact, Senegal Navy shares similar structure and interception
capabilities with Côte D’Ivoire Navy; in contrast Nigeria Navy is better equipped and
have more experience in these operations so they could represent a field of experts.
Using the risk analysis principles, the questionnaires and interviews aimed to touch
different respondents to generate a qualitative and a quantitative assessment of risks
based on their personal experience and professional judgement. The sample of
respondents encompassed all categories of naval personnel without any distinction
of ranks and position, chosen based on their professional experience in boarding
operations and their position. In addition, the data collection framework was assessed
and approved by the Research Ethics Committee (REC) of the parent organization
covering the research, namely the World Maritime University (WMU).
3.1

Questionnaires
The questionnaires were distributed to collect inputs of all personnel

participating to VBSS operations. For the French-speaking respondents, the
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questionnaires were translated into their language. In order to avoid errors in the
translation, respondents with a good level of English language received a first draft of
the questions to check the accuracy of the translation. Later, misunderstandings of
specific terms, particularly naval and military vocabulary, were reduced by sending
the questions to Navy officers proficient in both English and French for checking.
Then, the confusing terms and the translation were clarified to ensure a greater and
better understanding by the participants. The final draft was the one transmitted to all
respondents. The validity of the responses can be acknowledged since the targeted
audience had a direct role in the conduct of boarding operations with years of
experience. In this research, the participants dedicated themselves with sincerity and
honesty in providing the answers which evidenced their willingness to participate in
the enhancement of capabilities in boarding operations by tackling the risks
associated.
3.1.1

Questionnaire for risk profile
The structure for risk profile described by Yoe (2019) was the basis for this

questionnaire (see Appendix A). The purpose was to conduct a preliminary
identification of risks and to evaluate the current state of knowledge about those risks.
The sample of respondents was taken from all categories of naval personnel, with a
focus on participants in the top and middle level management. The questionnaire
embodied 29 open-ended questions divided into three sections, which are
generalities, description of risks and management of risks in boarding operations (see
Appendix B). The participants received the questionnaire electronically via email
using the GOOGLE FORMS platform in order to reach the maximum of persons and
to obtain honest answers (see appendix G).
3.1.2

Questionnaire for risk assessment
This questionnaire intended to collect information in order to answer the

informal questions of risk analysis (Kaplan & Garrick, 1981):
-

What can go wrong?

-

How can it happen?

-

What are the consequences?

-

How likely is it to happen?
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The questionnaire contained 38 questions divided into 8 sections or themes
(see Appendix C). The questionnaire was designed using information collected from
the literature and the inputs given by the participants in the questionnaire for risk
profile. It was a combination of risk assessment frameworks and intended to assess
safety hazards and security threats in the same questionnaire. The structure did not
separate them in order not to introduce biases in the mind of respondents who
encountered those dangers simultaneously. It was shared online as a GOOGLE
FORMS form or in hard paper copy to the maximum of available participants for the
sake of increasing the reliability of the data. The section 1 gathered general
information about boarding operations. Theme 2 and Theme 5 were focused
respectively on the likelihood and the severity of hazards and threats identified. These
two themes were adaptation of the Formal Safety Assessment implemented by the
IMO (2002), applied on the case studied. The section 3 intended to collect information
about the nature of the security threats while section 4 was dedicated to the value of
the assets involved. The process for Threat analysis of the commonwealth of
Kentucky office of Homeland security (Bennet, 2018) and Asset criticality evaluation
defined by Bennet (2018) represented the basis for the creation of these last two
sections. Theme 6 addressed information about the vulnerability of assets, which
derived from the vulnerability characterization in the CARVER target analysis tool
(Bennet, 2018). The questions of risk management policy and procedures were
covered in section 7 in the form of Likert scale questions; the questions covered four
topics: role of top management, risk awareness, procedures and organizational
culture; in order to ensure reliability of the answers, two questions were in the negative
form and one is a positive form with a negative connotation. And finally, section 8
targeted personal and additional information from the respondents (see appendix G).
3.2

Interviews
Considering the scarcity of data and the uncertainty characterizing this

research topic, the interviews aimed to obtain deep insights about risks of interests,
which were identified in the questionnaires, and to fill the gaps and to calibrate inputs
on RCOs. The interviews targeted experienced professionals in their field of activity.
The questions were inspired from the 4 informal questions of risk analysis
abovementioned with additional themes to explore RCOs (see Appendix D). In total,
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three participants were interviewed. All the interviews were conducted and recorded
using the software ZOOM with the consent of the respondents (see appendix G).
3.3

Secondary data
This dissertation relied also on supplementary data extracted from an analysis

of mission reports, shipboard documents and textual materials from regional maritime
organizations in West Africa and Defence organizations like the NATO. The NATO
ATP-71 publication was extensively reviewed.
4.

Data analysis
The data collected through the questionnaires were matched together to

obtain the possible risk scenarios related to safety and security matters separately.
Then, the risk scenarios were identified by eliminating the unbelievable or impossible
scenarios based on the literature and the nature of the assets at risk. Lastly, the
information provided by the interviews were combined with those in the surveys to
frame adequate RCOs.
4.1

Risk marking system
The identification of risk of interests was achieved by attributing a numerical

value or index to the dangers in risk matrices. The indexes were on a logarithmic scale
in order to facilitate the calculation of risk equations (IMO, 2002). The average of the
index per responses determined the index for each danger:

Avg INDEX = [Sum (ni x INDEXi )] / N
N : total number of responses = Sum (ni)
ni : number of responses for the item i
INDEXi : corresponding index to item i
The risk estimation was not meant to categorically rank the risk scenarios but
to identified risks which need mitigation. These risks are referred in this dissertation
as “identified risk scenarios”. The dangers with the risk index above the defined
thresholds represented the identified risk scenarios.
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4.1.1

Safety hazards
Safety hazards were identified by quantifying the risk using the formula (1) to

form a matrix. The severity represented the index attributed to the consequence of a
scenario. The frequency was the number of occurrences per unit of boarding (see
Appendix E). This risk model has been inspired by the definition given by the IMO
(2002) since it proved to be effective in providing good inputs in a decision making
process (IMO, 2002). Risk mitigation considered scenarios with a risk index superior
or equal to 6, using the formula (A).

Risk (hazards) = severity * frequency
RI (hazards) = SI + FI

4.1.2

(1)
(A)

Security threats
Risks posed by security threats were calculated by multiplying the vulnerability

of the asset, the level of threat, the frequency and the severity of an attack. This
definition was adapted from the one used in risk assessment in terrorist attacks (Cox,
2008a). The risk was estimated using the formula (2). The vulnerability provided a
numerical value for the level of protection of the asset against possible threats. The
level of threat gave a value to the nature of threats (see Appendix F). And the severity
and the frequency defined the indexes as described for safety hazards (see Appendix
E). The risk scenarios where an index was greater than 14, using the formula (B), are
the one considered problematic.

Risk (threats) = vulnerability * threat * severity * frequency
RI (threats) = VI + TI + SI + FI

4.2

(2)

(B)

Comparison of Risk assessment methods
Regarding the novelty of the framework applied and the absence of formal

study of risks on boarding operations, an additional factor was introduced in the risk
quantification method to test the objectivity of the results since the responses depicted
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the experience of participants. A value factor was added to the formulas (1) and (2)
to get the formulas (3) and (4) respectively. The value represented the importance of
an asset for the fulfilment of the tasks carried out in these operations or the
consequence if the integrity and/or the availability of this asset is compromised, which
is defined as operational value index (OVI) for the purpose of this dissertation (see
appendix E and F). The reasoning was that if an asset had more value it was likely to
get priority in the implementation of RCMs (Bennet, 2018). The identified scenarios
were the risks with an index superior or equal to 14 for safety hazards and greater
than 21 for security threats, after calculating the indexes with formulas (C) and (D).
These limits supposed that the loss of the asset could have grave consequences or
more.

Risk (hazards) = value * severity * frequency

(3)

Risk (threats) = value * vulnerability * threat * severity * frequency
RI (safety) = OVI + SI + FI
RI (threats) = OVI + VI + TI + SI + FI

(4)

(C)
(D)

The hypothesis was as follow:
The value of the asset influences the determination of risk control options
The idea was to test if the addition of the value as a factor in the risk equation
changes the RCOs in line with the identified risk scenarios.
4.3

Risk management Likert scale
A value was given to the responses in section 7 (Likert scale), where 5 is the

answer “strongly agree” and 1 “strongly disagree”. The average score for a question
was the average score of the answers received from participants. A score higher than
4 means that the risk management aspect, which is assessed, is well implemented.
Only questions, with an average score of 3 or lower, were considered to require
improvements. Naturally, the score of the questions in negative form were reversed.
Thus, by targeting the risk management aspects with the lowest average score, this
dissertation brought added value in the risk management practices in boarding
operations.
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CHAPTER V RESEARCH FINDINGS AND DISCUSSION
This dissertation intended to analyse the possible risk scenarios affecting the
assets involved in VBSS operations in order to frame risk mitigation measures. As
mentioned earlier, the methodology relied on the personal experience and
professional judgement of the participants which might have bias depending on their
role in these operations. This limitation was overcome by taking into account each
opinion as an equal value to others. This chapter summarizes and discusses the data
obtained from the targeted organizations in this research. In order to facilitate the
analysis, the risk scenarios were codified as follow (see appendix H):
letters for the assets at risk + a letter for the nature of dangers + a number
for the dangers itself.
1.
1.1

Findings
Risk profile
This section is based on the results of the questionnaire for risk profile. In total,

18 participants provided their inputs (see appendix G). eight out of them held a top
management level position. All of them were naval personnel and for ethical reasons
their position was not disclosed. They were from different organizations: Navies
principally, the Regional maritime security centre of West Africa (CRESMAO), which
is one of the two regional security centres defined by the architecture of Yaoundé and
the permanent secretary of inter-ministerial committee for the state’s action at sea of
Côte D’Ivoire (SEPCIM-AEM) in charge of the coordination and the implementation
of the SNAEM.
The results suggested that boarding operations have a strategic importance
for this country. Indeed, they are a prime mean used for maritime law enforcement to
ensure the legal order at sea. Respondent RP1 stated this point when describing the
goal of these operations as follow: “to ensure compliance with regulations in the
context of public service missions or missions aimed at carrying out checks or
interceptions relating to the prerogatives of States in maritime areas under (their)
jurisdiction”. So, boarding operations could be carried for a multitude of purpose like
“the fight against IUU fishing, Narcotics or Piracy” as mentioned by RP2, RP3, RP7
and RP14. VBSS operations also require a variety of assets. Indeed, respondent RP4
rightly argued that “a warship, a small craft (rigid-hulled), qualified personnel (marine
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commandos, sailors with boarding skills prerequisites), security equipment (firearms,
ammunitions, etc.), safety equipment (lifejackets, gloves, etc.) and logistics
(healthcare, food, fuel, etc.)” must be put at contribution to fulfil the tasks. But RP2
and RP16 noticed the need of “specialists” like “fisheries or customs inspectors” in
certain cases.
The results acknowledged the hazardous nature of boarding operations. “man
overboard” (RP4, RP10, RP14, RP17, RP18), “hostile acts from visited ship’s
crewmembers” (RP2, RP10, RP13, RP14, RP15, RP18, RP19), “injury” (RP4, RP5,
RP13, RP14, RP15), “loss of equipment” (RP8), “sea state” (RP7, RP15, RP16),
“engine failure” (RP15), “shooting” (RP12, RP16), “slip” (RP4), “toxic products” (RP4,
RP17), “disease-related contamination” (RP4), “ladder accident” (RP12), “hostagetaking” (RP10), “capsizing” (RP10, RP14), “collision” (RP18), “fire” (RP17), “drowning”
(RP9, RP14) or “death” (RP9, RP11) were considered inherent dangers to the assets
of these operations. Correspondingly, the inputs suggested that capsizing, man
overboard, injury, slip and fall, loss of equipment or collision could be more recurrent
during the manoeuvres. The results showed also that the risk is permanent thorough
the course of operations as 84% of respondents assured, even though, the assets
are more exposed to the dangers during the active phase of the boarding and search.
RP17 confirmed that risks are higher “on board the small craft, when boarding the
vessel and inside compartments and rooms during visits and (searches)”. RP15
shared a similar point of view: “during the launching or recovery manoeuvres of the
small craft and the men on board and at the bottom of the ladder of the vessel visited”.
Even if the level of occurrence of accidents or incidents remains low: “rarely” (RP6,
RP3, RP9, RP15 and RP18), “once a year” (RP5 and RP13), “negligible” (RP4); their
consequences can be serious for the assets. Reporting the worst incident they
noticed, RP15 mentioned the loss of a boarding team in undetermined circumstances,
RP1, RP3, RP4 and RP5 mentioned the loss of one coxswain’s finger, RP13, RP14
and RP17 pointed the capsizing of the small craft with the boarding party on board.
This evidenced that assets, which approach the visited ship, are more susceptible to
be affected. This observation also confirmed that the participants considered the
human health as the value most at risk in VBSS operations (17 respondents) and
estimated that the risks are unequally distributed among the assets (13 respondents).
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Despite all these circumstances, boarding operations are still being conducted
and by all means decisions to accept a level of risk had to be made. The analysis of
the responses revealed that assets could be put at risk for different reasons. The
success of the mission (RP2), the preservation of human life (RP1, RP7 and RP8),
the interdiction of an illegal act (RP16) were some reasons given by the participants.
But also if the opportunity was bigger than the risk in situation where there was a
reasonable evidence of illegal activities (RP15). Furthermore, the results did not
ascertain the existence of a specific tool for risk assessment in boarding operations.
Indeed, it was observed that RCMs were used based on the professional judgment
and the experience of the personnel involved. However, the codification for this
process did not appear in the findings. Respondent RP4 mentioned a periodic risk
assessment without reference about the tools used. Likewise, an overview of the
observations showed three patterns in the options for risk mitigation. First, intelligence
was one of the options suggested. The aim is to share information (RP15) about the
suspected vessel (RP12, RP17) and the weather forecast (RP14) in order to assess
the threat level (RP18) and also to assess the situation in line with the experience and
the readiness of the boarding party (RP10). Second, control should be strengthened
through the establishment of standardized procedures (RP1, RP3, RP17) from the
lessons learned (RP3) and a thorough mission planning process (RP5, RP8, RP13),
which considers interagency cooperation (RP15). And lastly, the provision of
equipment (RP14, RP15) and the appropriate training (RP2) ensure the enhancement
of the capabilities of the personnel. In addition, the results suggested that contingency
planning is taken into account as 14 participants acknowledged the provision of a plan
in case of an incident. Further details on the RCOs revealed that the factors
influencing their implementation could be mission-related (RP14), the results of their
application in drills, a new review of strategy, the availability of finance (RP15), the
experience of the personnel (RP18) or the need for update (RP4). Nevertheless, their
efficiency differed since respondent RP18 estimated it is as “high level”, while
participants RP1, RP2, RP15 and RP17 qualified them as “good”. According to some
of them, the performance of the measures is evaluated based on the results of
missions and during trainings and drills.
Regarding responsibilities of the top management, the inputs suggested that
it plays an important role from the onset to the end of operations. As “operational
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authority, it is the bridge between the State’s authorities and the force in order to
match strategic and operational objectives” (RP4). To do so, the top management
ensured the force readiness in every aspect and continuously decided during the
course of action. For instance, participant RP14 argued that it has “an upstream job
for procurement and training”. Later it follows, “through the MOC, the course of
ongoing operations to give orders…if necessary” (RP1). It is in charge of decisions
related to “procedures and legislation” (RP13), the use of fire weapons and the
interagency and international cooperation (RP15). Those decisions are based on
lessons learned and communicated through briefings and procedures (RP1, RP15),
like “operational directives and rule of engagement” (RP18). Furthermore, the results
implied the definition of a threshold for risk levels, however, this level of acceptance
was still subjective and not specific for each asset. Respondent RP15 stated the level
of acceptance of risks was determined depending on the gravity of risk for the country,
the availability of assets, their capabilities and the availability and training of
personnel. While participant RP4 estimated that it was an assessment of the
vulnerability of personnel, infrastructures and equipment which defined the
acceptance level. Similarly, “the impact on the physical integrity of personnel and the
condition of equipment” should be considered (RP1). Finally, additional inputs of
respondents suggested that the risks related to the heterogeneity of team with
different standards of training and qualifications (RP1), the non-domestication of
international conventions (RP15) and the psychological and societal impact on
personnel (RP4) could be matters of concern as well.
1.2

Risk estimation
This section presents the results of the questionnaire for risk assessment

described in section 3.1.2 of the methodology. The responses were introduced in risk
matrices to convert them in numerical values as explained in Chapter IV section 4.
The calculations were done with the MICROSOFT EXCEL software (see appendix I).
The results of 28 participants were computed to obtain the results (see appendix G).
Among them, 86% were directly involved in boarding at sea and the remaining held
positions in supporting infrastructure on shore. Figure 11 also describes the
distribution of participants by years of experience in boarding operations.
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Figure 9: Repartition of participants per years of experience (questionnaire for
risk assessment)
1.2.1

Safety hazards
The complexity of boarding operations renders them subject to several types

of dangers. From navigational risks to occupational health and safety issues, the
actors involved are stressed. The results suggested a wide range of safety hazards
are unequally distributed among the assets. Using the formula (A), table 1 shows the
safety hazards whose index was greater than or equal to 6. On an average one asset
was affected by six hazards. It appeared that the boarding team members were the
most at risk with twelve scenarios and the service weapons and the communication
equipment the least with two scenarios. Likewise, the small craft’s crewmembers
experienced a higher risk level compared to the vessel’s crew members, even if in
principle they are part on the unique crew of the vessel. The equipment and naval
platforms used were relatively less impacted by the hazards where the small craft,
with five risk scenarios was the first.
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A closer look at the hazards revealed that their consequences on assets can
be differentiated. Using a colour code, the hazards, highlighted in red, may induce
death or total loss of the equipment while those in yellow represented direct life
threatening or severe damage situations for the assets. Presented in this perspective,
most

assets

appeared

to

experience

high-consequence

risks.

Therefore,

consideration must be placed on every asset to develop measures to reduce those
risks.
1.2.2

Security threats
The assessment for security threats reflected the results of the estimation of

risk based on the formula (B). Table 2 shows the security threats which risk index
exceeded the limit defined of 14. The overview of risk scenarios demonstrated that
boarding team members and small craft’s crewmembers, which could be in direct
contact with a potential adversary, were more likely to be targeted. Although, the
scenarios appeared to be few, the nature of the potential adversaries and their
motivation could make them complex and catastrophic. So, in all scenarios human
life was jeopardized as shows by the colour code (red and yellow). Hence, a particular
attention was also required in addressing security threats to avoid them or to minimize
their impact.

- 39 -

According to the results, industrial fishing vessels and commercial vessels
were most likely the ones to be boarded whereas ferries and offshore vessels had the
least interest (See figure 10).

Figure 10: Most common type of vessel visited
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Looking at figure 11, the findings also showed that drug traffickers and pirates
represented the most probable potential adversaries in VBSS operations. Fishermen
and terrorists were also identified as potential attackers in a lower extent. Passengers
and offshore workers were not of many concern.

Figure 11: Nature of potential adversaries

1.3

Risk management and risk communication
The results of theme 7 of the questionnaire for risk assessment are presented

in this section. Table 3 showcases the average score for each question on a Likert
scale (see 4.3 of the methodology). An average score of 3 or lower needed attention
and consideration (in yellow) (see appendix J).
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-

Top management:

The average score for the question related to the role of the top management in
risk management showed that the perception of the role in decision making was
understood and recognized.

This observation confirmed the importance of its

implication in the risk analysis process.
-

Procedures

The results suggested that contingency procedures have been established to deal
with unexpected events, however the utilization of a risk assessment tool was not a
common practice for the targeted organization. This inconsistency in procedures
needed improvement.
-

Risk awareness

For the theme, the observations clearly showed that the actors involved in
boarding operations had a knowledge about the risks.
-

Organizational culture

The findings for this aspect implied that on an average the behaviours drifted
towards risk which was accepted in the organization.
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1.4

Comparison of methods
Assuming that the value of an asset could influence the scenarios chosen for

the implementation of RCMs, the section presents the findings for the estimation of
risk with the additional factor defined as OVI. The hypothesis was to ascertain if the
introduction of this factor in the equation would influence the identified risk scenarios
and subsequently the implementation of RCOs.


Safety hazards

Table 4 presents the different risk scenarios based on the two formulas (A) and
(C). The results showed that there were more risk scenarios in the second method
than the first. Two assets out of the seven had additional risk scenarios. Those
scenarios were highlighted in yellow. The small craft had a reduction of one scenario
highlighted in green. In total, eight additional risk scenarios required consideration,
bringing the number to 48 in the second method.
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Figure 12 : Comparison of risk estimation methods for safety hazards
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By comparing the distribution of risk scenarios among assets for the two methods
(see figure 12), it appeared that the share of each asset stayed approximatively the
same, with the exception of the small craft, which scenarios increased of 50%. But
based on its nature, SH10, SH11 and SH16 could not really impact it in reality. As the
methods used were not meant for a categorical ranking of the risk scenarios, the
observation led to estimate that the OVI had not much influence in their determination.


Security threats

Table 5 presents the different risk scenarios based on the two formulas (B) and
(D). A quick overview of the findings attested that five more risk scenarios should be
considered for mitigation with the second method. Compared to the first, this was an
increase of almost 50% scenarios. However, the results were not sufficient to confirm
that the OVI could influence RCOs. Indeed, VT1 and VT3 could be linked to VCT1
and VCT3 respectively when implementing RCMs. The same applied to ST2 and
SCT2.
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2.

Discussions
This section intends to discuss and to explore the main findings in order to

identify measures to mitigate the risks in VBSS operations.
2.1
2.1.1

Risk scenarios
Similarities with pilot boarding operations
Boarding operations require a party to board another vessel in order to carry

out specific tasks related to law enforcement. In the maritime industry, pilots are also
expected to board a vessel but for different purposes. However, the embarkation and
disembarkation on a ship is a common point with VBSS operations. Interviewee INT1
acknowledged similarities between pilot boarding operations and VBSS operations
regarding the embarkation and the disembarkation stages. By doing the parallel with
pilot boarding manoeuvres, occupational health and safety issues, revealed by the
findings, could be better understood and addressed. Indeed, occupational health and
safety deals more with day-to-day exposures to hazards due to normal operations
(Ng & Hassim, 2015). Many safety hazards identified by the assessment felt in this
category. As presented in the findings, the period between the small craft is
waterborne to the boarding itself with a pilot ladder appeared to be risky. One crucial
moment was the moment where the personnel was on the ladder (see figure 13). In
this manoeuvre, Interviewee INT1 viewed the risks higher during the disembarkation
because the evaluation of the situation is biased since the pilot could only appreciate
it only after climbing down the ladder and at this point he had to leave the ship
whatever the environmental conditions might be. After more than 5000 ships serviced,
interviewee INT1 estimated that the level of occurrence of major accidents was rare
since no fatalities were recorded and only three accidents of this type came to his
knowledge in Côte d’Ivoire: a pilot fallen in water, a crushed toe and a crushed ankle.
The most common incidents remained missed step on the pilot ladder, shocks on
articulations or injuries. However, these figures might change since minor incidents
are not always reported. Finally, participant INT1 noticed than the psychological
impact due the permanent risk factor or after an accident pushed some pilots to leave
the corporation.
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Figure 13: Embarkation of Boarding team (US Navy, 2021)

2.1.2

Links between risk scenarios
The conceptual framework, used for assessing the risks in this dissertation,

grabbed scenarios which were most likely to affect the assets involved. However, the
assets do not play a role in isolation of each other in reality. There are close links of
interdependency between them to create a synergy of action. In this perspective, risks
affecting one asset could have an impact on another. By the same token, developing
RCMs for on asset could transfer risks to other assets. But, the method of assessment
could not highlight those relationships using numerical values (Cox, 2009b). Thus,
identifying those possible interconnections between risks scenarios was important to
consider for the development of RCMs. These links could be a direct relationship or
a direct or indirect consequence. For instance, a pilot ladder accident (BTH6) might
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end with a boarding team member falling overboard (BTH5), consequently his
equipment would fall as well (WH5 and CH5). Another example was the small craft
and its crew which was targeted by a self-propelled explosive (ST3 and SCT3), the
attack could indirectly ignite fire in the craft (SH7). Similarly, if fire threatened the
vessel (VH7), its crew found itself in danger (VCH7). A complex case was a collision
of the small craft (SH13) which might lead to a technical failure (SH17) but also to
capsizing (SH14), then its crew ended in water (SCH5) and probably the boarding
team could fall overboard with their equipment (BTH5, WH5 and CH5), if they were
on board at that moment. Figure 14 shows some of the links between the risk
scenarios. Therefore, addressing those risks required the consideration of these
factors and stressed again the importance to protect all assets.

Figure 14: Links between risk scenarios (Author)
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2.2

Methods of assessment
This dissertation used a novel research framework to analyse risks in naval

operations. First, the results suggested that the qualitative and the quantitative
methods of assessment led to similar results with two different samples. This
observation confirmed that professional judgement and personal experience can be
valuable in assessing risk in VBSS operations. The comparison of quantitative
methods, based on the assumption that the operational value of one asset can
influence the determination of RCOs, suggested that this factor did not impact
significantly the scenarios and should not induce major changes in the implementation
of RCOs. And lastly, the inclusion of respondents from the Nigeria Navy and the
Senegal Navy highlighted the existence of common patterns which meant most issues
were not specific to Côte D’Ivoire Navy only.
2.3
2.3.1

Risk management and risk communication
Training and equipment
The results suggested that the provision of equipment and the conduct of the

right training were paramount to enable risk reduction in VBSS operations. Indeed,
equipment serve as barriers to protect personnel from the consequences of probable
accidents. They represent also a risk reduction factor in case personnel are targeted
by hostile acts. NATO (2005) provided a comprehensive set of equipment which
should be at the disposal of boarding party to ensure the safety of operations.
Interviewee INT1 pointed lifejacket, helmet, shin guard and visual identification signs
as requirement for a pilot. Also, participant INT2 added that a proper maintenance of
all equipment should be a prerequisite for an optimal level of protection. For
Interviewee INT3, a clear maintenance policy was also required. Concerning boarding
arrangements, interviewee INT1 argued that ship owners should devote more
resources to preserve their quality in accordance with requirements of the IMO (2011).
However, fishing vessels can hardly fulfil those requirements because of poor
maintenance, in addition to low freeboards which makes boarding operations more
hazardous (Five associations, 2021). This point retained attention since fishing
vessels were the type of vessels mostly visited (see figure 10).

- 50 -

Then, training comes to reinforce the capabilities by ensuring the right use of
equipment and giving a clear understanding of the procedures and the challenges
associated with these operations. It appears as a good channel to communicate about
risks. As figure 9 showed, with the assumption that they all received training before,
nearly three-quarters (20 participants) of the respondents in the questionnaire for risk
assessment, which had less than five years of experience, gave a fair evaluation of
the risks associated in boarding operations. Interviewee INT2 supported it by stating
that good training can also complement the lack of clear procedures. Participant INT3
shared the same opinion but added the necessity of follow-up training. Nevertheless,
this is not enough to ascertain that more years of practice and experience would not
be more beneficial. This observation joined the point of view of INT1 who estimated
that risk assessment was not part of the formal training of pilots but through the onthe-job learning process risk awareness was achieved.
2.3.2

Consideration for the nature of threats
The findings suggested that assets in VBSS operations are vulnerable to

several threats. The successful completion of a risk scenario can have severe
consequence. As stated in the literature review by Cox (2008a), using equations to
assess risk in security obliterates the ability and the unpredictability of intelligent
threats. Indeed, numerical value did not sufficiently describe planning, learning and
adaptive re-planning of intelligent attackers. To overcome this problem, the probable
attacker’s responses to risk management recommendations should be considered in
the defence preparation. Always in the idea of Cox (2008a), the aim was to optimize
defences assuming that attackers would optimize their attacks accordingly.
Addressing risks posed by those threats meant gathering information about them but
also preventing them to obtain useful information. Referring back to figure 12, the
identified potential adversaries usually wait for a window of opportunity in order to
execute their plan. Dalaklis (2019) argued that motive coupled with opportunity were
the two important element for the manifestation of threats. Therefore, reducing
opportunities for those threats was required. To do so, law enforcement authorities
relied on intelligence. As explained by Guilfoyle (2017), intelligence gathering is
important for intercepting those threats.
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2.3.3

Procedures
Boarding operations seemed to be procedural according to the findings, as

described also in the literature. Even if the course of action is defined, uncertainties
remain during different phases especially the boarding and search. Procedures
contribute to risk mitigation by giving inputs or outputs for the process of operations.
Interviewee INT3 argued that some initiatives were implemented but were functioning
in isolation. For instance, all interviewees recognized the effectiveness of the
protocols implemented by their organization to cope with the COVID-19 pandemic but
acknowledged the reduction of operational capabilities they created in other aspects
like human resources unavailability, limited time on duty, decrease of number of
inspections. In figure 14, the environmental conditions could impact the small craft
(SH9) and this could be the beginning of cascading events inducing risks to many
assets. So, the definition of clear guidance to balance the inherent limitations of the
platforms and equipment with weather conditions was a point to consider. Participant
INT1 considered effectively the sea state as a contributing factor to accidents.
Moreover, procedures play a role in the training of personnel. Indeed, certification of
teams should include procedures to evaluate their training and medical fitness but
also to ensure their continued proficiency. This point seemed to be important in
specific case where teams are mixed with people from different organizations.
Interviewees INT2 and INT3 also stressed the implementation of standard operating
procedures (SOPs) which need to be approved by the top management in order to
reduce the flexibility of personnel at sea who may not have the authority to support
decisions particularly when risks are higher. Finally, as mentioned by NATO (2005),
procedures for communication should be well established. In fact, reduction of risk
could be achieved if information flows among all stakeholders. Every actor should
give and receive inputs, like intelligence, environmental conditions, condition of the
visited vessel, mission objectives, for the safety of operations.
2.3.4

Development of systematic risk assessment tools
The findings revealed that risk awareness was at an acceptable level. But the

process of assessment for decision making was not clearly defined or was left to the
appreciation of every stakeholder. The consequence was the introduction of
subjectivity in the evaluation process. In this regard, one actor could have limited
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overview of the situation. As interviewee INT2 mentioned less experienced personnel
had a knowledge about dangers related to their equipment and their specific role but
lack of overall risk awareness. This observation called for a systematic risk
assessment process. In order to be effective, first, this process should involve all
levels of responsibility in VBSS operations. Second, the process should ensure
dissemination of relevant information through the chain of command. Finally, the
process should be duly documented and recorded. The end result should be the
standardization of the risk assessment procedures.
2.3.5

Organizational culture
The results showed a level of risk taking among actors in boarding operations.

Interviewee INT2 explained it by stating that even if resources at disposal were not
optimal, taking risks beyond capabilities was necessary for the protection of waters.
Besides, military organizations are hierarchical in nature so the willingness of the top
management or high command may be to overlook some risks in order to gain
opportunities. A way to overcome this issue is sensitization and professionalism.
Sensitization could increase the risk awareness while professionalism could incite
people to work always within the limits of their capabilities. Furthermore, mitigation
measures needed to get support from decision makers. Hence, the definition of key
performance indicators (KPIs) was also a point for consideration. However,
participants INT2 noticed difficulties to obtain statistical data to back up arguments.
Interviewee INT1 pointed difficulties in convincing top management to make financial
resources available. Similarly, he estimated that external factors, like the drive for
profit in the maritime industry, push ship owners to reduce investments in necessary
arrangements for boarding at sea. In any case risk assessment was important, as
interviewee INT2 concluded: “risk assessment is linked to (our) capacity to fulfil the
mission” because it helps getting the “so what”. For this reason, the development of
“safety culture” was a prerequisite because “safety is a key element of success for
all” (interviewee INT3).
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CHAPTER VI CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
This chapter summarizes the work in this dissertation and intends to propose
recommendations according to the findings and discussions.
1.

Conclusions
This dissertation endeavoured to apply risk analysis principles to frame

measures which could mitigate effectively risks in VBSS operations in Côte D’Ivoire.
The aim was to set the pathway for a safer environment for the assets contributing to
the success of these operations. To meet this objective, this dissertation followed a
conceptual research framework based on existing risk analysis frameworks. The first
step was to identify the dangers, related to safety and security, and to estimate the
risk level in order to develop risk scenarios. To do so, qualitative and quantitative
methods of assessment, using surveys and questionnaires, were framed to evaluate
principally the likelihood and the consequence of those dangers. The determination
of factors influencing RCOs and the channels used for risk communication were the
next two steps. The inputs were collected from personnel in the chain of command of
boarding operations and they reflected their professional judgment and personal
experience.
The findings demonstrated that VBSS operations hold a strategic role in
conducting law enforcement at sea in Côte D’Ivoire. Despite the permanent risk
factors, the level of occurrence of incidents can be considered marginal. However,
the consequence of those incidents can be severe for assets involved. While human
health is the value most at risk, risks are unequally distributed among assets.
Additionally, there are direct or indirect links between risks scenarios which
complicate the situation. Furthermore, the nature of threats and their motive make the
outcome of an event more complex and severe. Also, the value of an asset does not
influence the development of risk mitigation measures. Therefore, managing those
risks requires a comprehensive approach which target specific areas for
improvement.
The results also acknowledged that a level of risk acceptance is considered
but the criteria are not clearly defined. The absence of a risk assessment tool may be
a reason. As a consequence, personal experience guides the definition of RCMs,
making them subjective and incomplete. In this aspect, those RCMs have variable
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performance in bringing risks ALARP. For risk mitigation, efficient information sharing,
capacity building through procedures, equipment and training and improving
organizational

behaviours

are

the

recommended

options.

However,

their

effectiveness depends on the support and approval of the top management in the
chain of command.
Finally, the observations showed that the methodology used can be suitable
to analyse risks in VBSS operations as the outputs of different methods are
convergent. According to Yoe (2019), risk assessments “… do not always produce
the truth and they never produce decisions” (p. 103), they only provide information to
risk managers. Hence, information in this dissertation obtained from experts’ opinion
in the field of study can be relevant for decision makers in Côte D’Ivoire Navy.
2.

Recommendations
After analysis and discussions, the areas which needed improvement or

attention led to the formulation of the following recommendations. These
recommendations do not stand alone but function as a systems approach of physical
and administrative barriers with four pillars, Training, Equipment, Organizational
culture, and Procedures, which could be integrated to a safety management system
(SMS) (Dalaklis, 2017b). Figure 15 summarizes the recommended options.
2.1.1


Prior to operations
Training

No matter the role played in boarding operations, a high level of proficiency and
specific skills are required. Côte D’Ivoire Navy should ensure that the personnel
conducting these operations receive the adequate education and training. This
training should also emphasize topics like risk awareness and risk assessment. A
partnership with the corporation of pilots in the port of Abidjan should be beneficial for
experience sharing especially for the best practices in embarkation and
disembarkation.


Equipment

Equipment represent one of the barriers preventing an accident or reducing its
consequence. The personnel in these operations should wear the appropriate
personal protective equipment (PPE) adapted to the marine environment but also to
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the level of threats. Certainly, the procurement of those equipment should be made
in collaboration with the users to ensure their suitability to the operational
requirements. A particular attention should be devoted to the maintenance
programme of those equipment to ensure they are always functioning at the optimal
level of protection.


Procedures

Another important point to consider is the development and the renewal of SOPs.
To be effective, these procedures ought to be approved by the high command in Côte
D’Ivoire Navy. The process of intelligence gathering and dissemination should involve
every relevant actor and should be supported by clear communication procedures
which come to enable the flow of information among all stakeholders. Information
concerning weather forecasts, condition of vessels, level of threats, level of
proficiency of the personnel must be collected and shared. Furthermore, the
processes for qualification of personnel and vetting of equipment should be
standardized in order to avoid disparities. Moreover, the top management in the navy
should consider establishing rules of engagement (ROE). Those ROE must define as
clearly as possible, for instance, the conditions for using weapons, the self-defence
principles, the classification of threats and the prerogatives of each decision maker.
Usually, procedures, like Go and No Go checklists, could be a starting point. Côte
D’Ivoire Navy should also set up clear procedures for incident reporting. Finally, the
inputs and outputs of those procedures are expected to be properly documented and
archived by a designated authority.


Organizational culture

As a military organization, risk has become an accepted parameter in Côte
D’Ivoire navy operations. Côte D’Ivoire Navy should emphasize sensitization and
professionalism to reduce complacency. Indeed, a new narrative about risks needs
to be conveyed among the stakeholders. Risk should not be the norm and safety must
always prevail. During planning, training, and briefings, risks should be discussed and
measures to mitigate them must be identified. But also, at the decision making level,
the need for a right balance between the necessity of the mission, the limitations of
assets and the prerogatives of decision makers should be understood.
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2.1.2


During operations
Equipment

During operations, the personnel should continuously monitor the state of their
equipment to ensure their effectiveness has not been compromised at any point of
time.


Procedures

As discussed, boarding operations can have uncontrollable factors like people
behaviours, weather or conditions of vessel encountered. Those factors can create
uncertainties in the process of managing risks. So, risk necessitates to be evaluated
on-scene too. To do so, the OSC should rely on a clear and consistent process. Côte
D’Ivoire Navy should consider to implement a model similar to the GAR tool
developed by the USCG. This process should be systematically documented and
reported to the MOC for top management’s decision if necessary. Nothing should also
prevent the BO to repeat this procedure for his own specific tasks. In addition, the
personnel deployed at sea should possess a comprehensive contingency plan to
respond to emergencies and unexpected events.


Organizational culture

From an organizational standpoint, reporting any incident or near miss should
become the norm and attention should be devoted to encourage this culture.
2.1.3

After operations
Following operations, all relevant data and information should be analysed

and the feedback recorded. It will provide inputs for improvement of planning and for
statistical studies. At the end, the normalisation of this process will facilitate the
measurement of KPIs and the implementation of corrective measures.
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Figure 15: Recommendations for Risk control options (Author)
3.

Contribution to knowledge
This dissertation proved that experts’ judgement for the estimation of

probability of high-severity rare incidents can produce relevant information for
decision makers. Furthermore, it showed that the combination of a qualitative and a
quantitative risk assessment model could bridge the gap and have valuable outputs.
In addition, this research contributed to risk analysis studies in the maritime field in
the sense that it framed a methodology applicable to naval operations not only in Côte
D’Ivoire but also in countries of the GoG.
4.

Recommendations for future research
At this point, further studies could integrate statistical models to calibrate the

risk scenarios highlighted and reduce the reliance on experts’ opinion. However, the
low number of incidents may require records over a long period of time or a large
sample of law enforcement organizations. The psychological and societal impacts due
to permanent risk factors and serious injuries could be investigated further to evaluate
their effects on the dynamic of operations.
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Appendix A
Risk profile. Yoe (2019)


Latest statement of the problem



Description of the hazard or opportunity involved



How assets are exposed to the hazard



Frequency, distribution, and levels of occurrence of the
hazard



Identification of possible risks from the available scientific
literature



Nature of values at risk (human health, economic, cultural,
etc.)



Distribution of the risk and benefits from the risky activity



High level or preliminary assessment or prioritization of the
risks



Characteristics of available risk management options



Current risk management practices relevant to the issue



Public perceptions of the potential risks



Information about possible risk management (control)
measures



Preliminary identification of important scientific data gaps
that may prevent or limit a risk assessment



International implications of risk management



Risk management objectives



Decision to pursue a risk assessment



Questions to be answered by risk assessment
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Appendix B
QUESTIONS FOR RISK PROFILE
Generalities
1.

In which type of naval operations is it necessary to conduct to do a boarding?

2.

What are the assets engaged in Visit board search and seizure operations?

3.

What are the inherent dangers of these types of operations?

4.

How many ships are necessary to conduct these operations?

None/1/2/3/more than 3
5.

How many personnel is necessary to carry out the tasks?

1-10/11-20/21-30/31-50/51-100/more than 100
6.

How many small craft is necessary to carry out the tasks?

None/1/2/3/more than 3
Description of risks
7.

How are assets exposed to the hazards?

8.

How many boarding do you conduct in a year?

1-10/11-20/21-30/31-50/51-100/more than 100
9.

How often do you have an incident or accident during these operations?

10. Is the danger always present?
11. Which hazards are most likely to be recurrent?
12. What are the values put at risk in these operations?
Human health/cultural/geostrategic/environment/political/other (specify)
13. How do you describe the worst incident you had in these operations?
14. Are the risks equally distributed among the assets?
15. Which assets are most likely to be affected?
Management of risks
16. What can be a good reason to put your assets at risk?
17. Which tool do you use to assess risks in your organization?
18. How do you differentiate the safety hazards from the security threats?
19. What are the main characteristics of your risk control options?
20. How are risks in these operations currently mitigated in your organization?
21. Do you have a contingency plan for an incident in these operations?
22. How do you measure the effectiveness of the risk management practices?
23. What is the role of the top management in Visit board search and seizure operations?
24. How risks are taken into account in the decision making?
25. What are the requirements which influence the implementation of risk control measures?
26. How do you determine the level of risk acceptance?
27. In your opinion, what is the value of risk assessment in these operations?
no value added/relevant/no opinion
For your organization particularly? no value added/relevant/no opinion
28. Can you provide two questions in relation to risk you think this study should answer?
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Appendix C
QUESTIONS FOR RISK ASSESSMENT
This study intends to analyse risks in Visit board search and seizure Operations in Côte D’Ivoire Navy to find out an
“acceptable in terms of risk” method to use, as well as to further develop the Risk Control Measures which could be
used to mitigate these risks effectively.
For the purpose of the research, it will be considered only the risks incurred by the assets directly involved in the
conduct of those operations (humans, vessels and equipment)
GUIDELINES
PLEASE READ CAREFULLY THE INSTRUCTIONS BELOW:
- If you do not know a “clear” answer to a question or if the question does not apply, please do not provide input.
- Please note that operations refer to Visit Board Search and Seizure operations (unless otherwise specified in the
relevant instructions).
- Please note that all questions refer to the components directly involved in Visit board search and seizure Operations
(unless otherwise stated).
- Always answer the questions having in mind YOUR role in the operations.
- Please DO NOT use abbreviations or acronyms
- The potential sensitivity of some questions has been acknowledged. Confidentiality of the respondents is ensured.
Individual answers are/will be not identified in any circumstances.
- This questionnaire requires approximately 30 minutes/up to an hour to be completed.
SECTION 1: IDENTIFICATION OF HAZARDS
1.

Which of the following risks do you think apply to Visit board search and seizure operations (can affect

humans, vessels or equipment)?
Biological

Navigational

hazards

risks

2.

Occupational
safety
health

and

Security
matters

Fire risk

Chemical

Others

hazards

(specify)

To which level do you estimate the risks during the following stages of these operations?
Very low

Low

Medium

High

Very high

Extremely
high

Pre-boarding
activities
(approach,
interception,
query)
Boarding
activities
(active
boarding,
search,
takedown)
Postboarding
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activities
(seizure,
diverting)

SECTION 2: LIKELYHOOD OF HAZARDS
●

3.

For the questions 3 to 9, please consider the marking system below:
Frequent

Likely to occur once in 3 boardings

Reasonably probable

Likely to occur once in 10 boardings

Remote

Likely to occur once in 100 boardings

Very remote

Likely to occur once in 10 000 boardings

To which extent boarding team member involved in these operations are exposed to the following

hazards?
4.

To which extent vessel involved in these operations are exposed to the following hazards?

5.

To which extent small craft involved in these operations are exposed to the following hazards?

6.

To which extent equipment (communication) involved in these operations are exposed to the following

hazards?
7.

To which extent equipment (service weapons) involved in these operations are exposed to the following

hazards?
8.

To which extent small craft’s crew member involved in these operations are exposed to the following

hazards?
9.

To which extent vessel’s crew member involved in these operations are exposed to the following hazards?
Very remote

Remote

Reasonably

Frequent

probable
Harmful substances
(dangerous

cargo,

biohazards,
chemicals)
illness (Covid 19)
Burns
Electric shock
Falling overboard
Pilot ladder accident
Fire
Submerged objects
Weather

(Storms,

Sea state, lighting)
Injury (fall, slip, trip)
Fatigue
Stress
Other

ship

(Collision)
Capsizing
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Grounding
Fire weapons
Sharp objects (cut)
Bladed

weapons/

blunt weapons
Explosives
Technical failure
Confined spaces
Self-propelled
explosive

(missile,

torpedo, rocket)
Others (specify)

SECTION 3: NATURE OF SECURITY THREATS
10.

Which one of the following can be a potential adversary? (check 5 responses)

Seafarer/Fisherman

(industrial)/Fisherman

(artisanal)/Drug

trafficker/Seasonal

fisherman/Terrorist/Pirate/Passenger/Oil rig worker/Other
11.

Which types of ships are most likely to be boarded? (Check 4 responses)

Merchant vessel (container, tanker, bulk carrier)/Fishing boat (artisanal)/Fishing vessel (industrial)/Pleasure
boat/Fishing boat (leisure fishing)/tug boat/Cruise or Passenger ship/Ferry/Offshore vessel/Other (specify)
12.

Are these threats present or thought to be present? (Existence) (use Y/N table below)

13.

Do the adversaries have to capability to carry out attacks using: (use Y/N table below)

14.

What attacks has the potential adversary committed in the past? (history) (use Y/N table below)
Yes

No

Handgun
Blunt weapon
Bladed weapon
Missile/ torpedo
Machine gun
Rifle
Rocket propeller
Artillery
Explosives

15.

Do you know if an adversary is performing surveillance on the key assets? (targeting)
Yes

No

Boarding team member
Vessel’s crew member
Small craft’s crew member
Communication equipment
Small craft
Navy vessel
Service weapon
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16.

What does the potential adversary hope to achieve? (intention)

SECTION 4: ASSET VALUE
17.

How do you evaluate the value of the following assets? (consequence of damage or loss on the fulfilment

of the mission)
Please consider the marking system below:
Very high

Exceptionally grave consequences

High

Grave consequences

Medium high

Serious consequences

Medium

Moderate to serious consequences

Medium low

Moderate consequences

Low

Minor consequences

Very low

Negligible consequences

Very low

Low

Medium

Medium

low
Boarding

Medium

High

Very high

high

team

member
Navy vessel’s crew
member
Small

craft’s

crew

member
Communication
equipment
Small craft
Navy vessel
Service weapon

SECTION 5: IMPACT ON HUMANS AND EQUIPEMENT
●

For the questions 18 to 20, please consider the marking system below:
Severity

Effects on humans

Negligible

Single or minor injuries

Significant

Multiple or severe injuries

Critical

Single fatality or multiple severe injuries

Catastrophic

Multiple fatalities

18.

How do you evaluate the effects of the following hazards on Boarding team member?

19.

How do you evaluate the effects of the following hazards on vessel’s crew member?

20.

How do you evaluate the severity of the following hazards on Small craft’s crew member?
Negligible

Significant

Critical

Catastrophic

Harmful substances
(dangerous

cargo,

biohazards,
chemicals)
illness (Covid 19)
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Burns
Electric shock
Falling overboard
Pilot ladder accident
Fire
Submerged objects
Weather

(Storms,

Sea state, lighting)
Injury (fall, slip, trip)
Fatigue
Stress
Other

ship

(Collision)
Capsizing
Grounding
Fire weapons
Sharp objects (cut)
Bladed

weapons/

blunt weapons
Explosives
Technical failure
Confined spaces
Self-propelled
explosive

(missile,

torpedo, rocket)
Others (specify)
●

For the questions 21 to 24, please consider the marking system below:
Severity

Effects on equipment

Negligible

No significant damage

Significant

Minor damage (able to function partially)

Critical

Severe damage (not able to function at all)

Catastrophic

Destruction or total loss

21.

How do you evaluate the effects of the following hazards on Vessel?

22.

How do you evaluate the effects of the following hazards on Small Craft?

23.

How do you evaluate the effects of the following hazards on Equipment (communication)?

24.

How do you evaluate the effects of the following hazards on Equipment (service weapons)?

Negligible

Significant

Critical

Catastrophic

Harmful substances
(dangerous

cargo,

biohazards,
chemicals)
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illness (Covid 19)
Burns
Electric shock
Falling overboard
Pilot

ladder

operation
Fire
Submerged objects
Weather

(Storms,

Sea state, lighting)
Injury (fall, slip, trip)
Fatigue
Stress
Other

ship

(Collision)
Capsizing
Grounding
Fire weapons
Sharp objects (cut)
Bladed

weapons/

blunt weapons
Explosives
Technical failure
Confined spaces
Self-propelled
explosive

(missile,

torpedo, rocket)
Others (specify)

SECTION 6: VULNERABILITY
25.

How much do you estimate the level of protection of the following assets:
Boarding

Vessel’s

Small

team

crew

craft’s

member

member

crew

Vessel

Small

Service

Communication

craft

weapon

equipment

member
Vulnerable

to

bladed

weapons

or

blunt

weapons
Vulnerable to small arms
fire (handgun)
Vulnerable to light antiarmour weapons (rifle)
Vulnerable to medium
anti-armour weapons fire
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(machine

gun,

explosives)
Vulnerable to heavy antiarmour

fire

specialized

or

weapons

(rocket propeller, naval
artillery)
Invulnerable to all but the
most extreme targeting
measures

(Missile,

torpedo)

SECTION 7: RISK MANAGEMENT
Questions

strongly disagree

Disagree

No opinion (neutral)

agree

strongly agree

26- the current
practices in my
organization can
mitigate the risks
mentioned
27- the risks in these
operations are known
by every actors
28- the top
management in your
organization consider
the risks in the
decision making
29- the top
management plays an
important role in risk
management
30- risk assessment is
a common practice in
your organization
31- your organization
has developed a risk
assessment tool for
these operations
32- risk assessment is
part of my training
33- I know what to do
in case of an incident
occurred
34- Taking risk is
necessary to fulfil the
mission
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SECTION 8: ADDITIONAL INFORMATION
35.

What is your current position in your organization?

36.

What is your experience in Visit board search and seizure Operations? (position held in the past or training)

37.

How many years of experience do you have in these operations?

00/1-5/6-10/11-15/16-20/more than 20
38.

Excluding the questions in this questionnaire, can you please provide more information on the risks in these

operations?
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Appendix D
QUESTIONS INTERVIEW
This study intends to analyze risks in Visit board search and seizure Operations in
Côte D’Ivoire Navy to find out an “acceptable in terms of risk” method to use, as well
as to further develop the Risk Control Measures which could be used to mitigate these
risks effectively.
For the purpose of the research, it will be considered only the risks incurred by the
assets directly involved in the conduct of those operations (humans, vessels and
equipment)

1. Can you describe how a person embarks and disembarks a ship?
2. How often do you have incidents or accidents in your job (affecting your own
resources)?
3. What are the most recurring incidents?
4. What can the worst accident of your career look like?
5. What factors have contributed to such a scenario?
6. Do you think that you have an adequate level of protection against the risks
associated with this maneuver?
7. What specific measures could improve this level of protection?
8. What protective measures have you taken during the COVID19 pandemic?
9. What other measures can be implemented to reduce the consequences of an
accident?
10. Has your organization performed a risk assessment in these operations?
11. What can be done to improve risk management for this kind of maneuver?
12. How important is risk assessment in your training?
13. What can be the challenges related to the development of a risk assessment tool
for boarding operations?
14. How many years of experience do you have in this corporation?
15. Can you give a figure for the number of maneuvres you have performed in your
career?
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Appendix E
 Value (Asset criticality (Bennet, 2018))

OVI
10
9
7
6
4
3
1

Operational value index
Value
Definition (damage or loss)
Very
Exceptionally grave consequences
high
High
Grave consequences
Medium
Serious consequences
high
Medium
Moderate to serious consequences
Medium
Moderate consequences
low
Low
Minor consequences
Very low
Negligible consequences
 Severity (IMO, 2002)

SI

Severity

1

Negligible

2

Significant

3

Critical

4

Catastrophic

Effects on human
Single or minor
injuries
Multiple or severe
injuries
Single fatality or
multiple severe
injuries
Multiple fatalities

Effects on ship or
equipment
No significant damage
Minor damage (able
to function partially)
Severe damage (not
able to function at all)
Destruction or total
loss

 Frequency (IMO, 2002)
FI
7
5
3
1

Frequency
Definition
Frequent
Likely to occur once in 3 boardings
Reasonably
Likely to occur once in 10 boardings
probable
Remote
Likely to occur once in 100 boardings
Very
Likely to occur once in 10 000 boardings
remote
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Appendix F

OVI
10
9
7
6
4
3
1

 Value index (Asset criticality (Bennet, 2018))
Operational value index
Value
Definition (damage or loss)
Very
Exceptionally grave consequences
high
High
Grave consequences
Medium
Serious consequences
high
Medium
Moderate to serious consequences
Medium
Moderate consequences
low
Low
Minor consequences
Very low
Negligible consequences

 Threat level (the commonwealth of Kentucky office of Homeland security)
(Bennet, 2018)
Threat index
Threat
TI
Existence Capability
History
Intention Targeting
level
5
Severe
X
X
X
X
X
4
High
X
X
X
X
O
3
Yellow
X
X
X
O
2
Blue
X
X
O
1
Green
X
O
X = factor must be present; O = factor may or may not be present
 Vulnerability (CARVER target analysis tool) (Bennet, 2018)
Vulnerability index
VI
Definition
Vulnerable to bladed weapons or blunt
10
weapons
9
Vulnerable to small arms fire (handgun)
Vulnerable to light anti-armor weapons
7
(rifle)
Vulnerable to medium anti-armor
5
weapons fire (machine gun, explosives)
Vulnerable to heavy anti-armor fire or
3
specialized weapons (rocket propeller,
naval artillery)
Invulnerable to all but the most extreme
1
targeting measures (Missile, torpedo)
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Appendix G
List of participants: Questionnaire for risk profile

Participants

Organization

RP1
RP2
RP3
RP4
RP5
RP6
RP7
Côte D’Ivoire Navy
RP8
RP9
RP10
RP11
RP12
RP13
RP14
RP15

SEPCIM-AEM (Côte
D’Ivoire)

RP16

CRESMAO

RP17

Senegal Navy

RP18

Nigeria Navy
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List of participants: Questionnaire for risk assessment
Participants

Position

RA1

Commanding officer

RA2

Commanding officer

RA3

Commanding officer

RA4

Executive officer

RA5

Executive officer

RA6

Executive officer

RA7

Executive officer

RA8

Executive officer

RA9

Staff officer

RA10

Boarding officer

RA11

Boarding officer

RA12

Boarding team member

RA13

Boarding team member

RA14

Boarding team member

RA15

Boarding team member

RA16

Boarding team member

RA17

Boarding team member

RA18

Boarding team member

RA19

Boarding team member

RA20

Boarding team member

RA21

Boarding team member

RA22

Small craft’s crew

RA23

MOC officer

RA24

MOC chief

RA25

Commanding officer

RA26

Commanding officer

RA27

Commanding officer

RA28

Staff officer

Organization

Côte D’Ivoire Navy

Senegal Navy

Nigeria Navy
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List of participants: Interview

Participants

Position

Organization

INT1

Port pilot

Port of Abidjan

INT2

Commanding officer

INT3

Chief of Operations

Côte D’Ivoire Navy

bureau
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Appendix H
ASSETS
Boarding team member

BT

Vessel’s crew

VC

Small craft’s crew

SC

Vessel

V

Small craft

S

Communication equipment

C

Service weapon

W

HAZARDS
Harmful substances (dangerous cargo, biohazards, chemicals)

H1

illness (Covid 19)

H2

Burns

H3

Electric shock

H4

Falling overboard

H5

Pilot ladder operation

H6

Fire

H7

Submerged objects

H8

Weather (Storms, Sea state, lighting)

H9

Injury (fall, slip, trip)

H10

Fatigue

H11

Stress

H12

Other ship (Collision)

H13

Capsizing

H14

Grounding

H15

Sharp objects (cut)

H16

Technical failure

H17

Confined spaces

H18

Others (specify)

H19

THREATS
Fire weapons

T1

Bladed weapons/ blunt weapons

T2

Explosives

T3

Self-propelled explosive (missile, torpedo, rocket)

T4

Others (specify)

T5
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Appendix I
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Appendix J
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